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PROSECUTORS WHO INTENTIONALLY BREAK THE LAW 
Angela J. Davis* 
 
 
The Supreme Court bears 
much of the responsibility for 
fostering a culture in which 
prosecutors feel free to engage 
in misconduct. 
Editors’ Note:  The following article is an excerpt from 
Arbitrary Justice: The Power of the American Prosecutor 
(forthcoming, Oxford University Press 2006) by Angela J. 
Davis. 
 
Brian was a fifteen-year-old African-American boy 
charged in the District of Columbia Juvenile Court with 
assault with intent to kill, burglary, and related charges. The 
government claimed that Brian and two adult men had 
severely beaten an older man during a burglary of his home. 
Brian’s adult co-defendants were charged with the same 
offenses and faced up to life in prison in adult court, where the 
Office of the United States Attorney for the District of 
Columbia prosecuted them.1 As a juvenile, the Office of the 
Corporation Counsel prosecuted Brian2 and he faced a 
maximum punishment of two years in 
the juvenile correctional facility upon 
conviction. The Juvenile Court rules 
protected his anonymity and offered the 
possibility of rehabilitative treatment if 
needed.  
The Assistant U.S. Attorney 
handling the case against the adult co-
defendants sought Brian’s assistance in 
their prosecution. He contacted the 
assistant corporation counsel in charge of Brian’s case and 
Brian’s court-appointed attorney to arrange an “off-the-record 
conversation.” The prosecutor hoped to secure Brian’s 
cooperation in the prosecution of the adults in exchange for 
lenient treatment, including possible dismissal of Brian’s case. 
During the meeting, the prosecutor questioned Brian about the 
events surrounding the assault and burglary. Brian’s attorney 
and mother were present during the meeting. Brian denied that 
either he or the adult codefendants had participated in the 
crimes.  
The prosecutor expressed his displeasure with 
Brian’s denials and pressured him to testify that the adults 
were involved. When Brian refused to submit to pressure, the 
prosecutor threatened to charge Brian as an adult if he 
declined to testify against the codefendants, warning him that 
he could receive a life sentence in an adult prison if convicted 
in adult court. Brian maintained that he knew nothing about 
the offenses and the meeting ended without a deal. Soon 
thereafter, the prosecutor made good on his threats. The 
juvenile case was dismissed, and Brian was charged as an 
adult.  
I was appointed to represent Brian in adult court. He 
immediately told me about the meeting with the prosecutor. I 
interviewed his mother, who verified the prosecutor’s threats 
and expressed her shock and dismay at what the prosecutor 
had done. “Can he get away with that?” she asked. I agreed 
that his behavior was unscrupulous, and after consulting with 
other lawyers at the Public Defender Service, I decided to file 
a motion to dismiss the indictment for prosecutorial 
vindictiveness. 
The judge assigned to Brian’s case scheduled a 
hearing, and Brian’s mother testified. She described the 
prosecutor’s threats in great detail, explaining how he had 
yelled at Brian and had promised to charge Brian as an adult 
if he did not corroborate the 
government’s story that he had helped the 
two adults beat and rob the complainant. 
The prosecutor representing the 
government at the hearing was not the 
same prosecutor who had threatened 
Brian. To my surprise, he declined to 
cross-examine Brian’s mother. Instead, he 
began to argue, in a very dismissive 
manner, that Brian’s mother was lying 
and that the threats were never made. The judge interrupted 
the prosecutor’s argument and asked whether he planned to 
present any evidence. The prosecutor appeared surprised and 
informed the judge that he would just “make representations” 
as an officer of the court.  This prosecutor apparently believed 
that he was not required to present testimony under oath and 
that the judge should simply accept his word to rebut the 
testimony of Brian’s mother. When it became clear that the 
judge planned to follow the rules of evidence and only 
consider the undisputed testimony of Brian’s mother, the 
prosecutor asked if he might have additional time to locate the 
prosecutor and present his testimony. The judge declined his 
request. 
The hearing ended late on a Friday afternoon, and 
Brian’s trial was scheduled to begin the following Monday 
morning. The judge declined to rule on the motion, indicating 
that she would take the matter under advisement. I warned my 
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client and his mother that they should not get their hopes up, 
that these motions were rarely granted, and that we should 
prepare to start the trial on Monday. 
On the following Monday morning, the case was 
called and my client and I joined the adult co-defendants and 
their lawyers at counsel table. The case had been assigned to 
another judge. He looked in my client’s court file and 
announced, “Ms. Davis, your client’s case has been 
dismissed. There is an order issued by Judge Williams 
granting your motion to dismiss the indictment for 
prosecutorial vindictiveness.” I was shocked.  Although I had 
challenged prosecutorial misconduct on many occasions 
during my years as a public defender, this was the only time a 
judge had granted the relief I had requested. 
The prosecutorial vindictiveness in Brian’s case is 
just one of the many forms of prosecutorial misconduct and is 
by no means the most common. Such misconduct may take 
many forms, including: 
• Courtroom misconduct (making 
inappropriate or inflammatory comments in 
the presence of the jury; introducing or 
attempting to introduce inadmissible, 
inappropriate or inflammatory evidence; 
mischaracterizing the evidence or the facts 
of the case to the court or jury; committing 
violations pertaining to the selection of the 
jury; or making improper closing 
arguments);  
• Mishandling of physical evidence (hiding, 
destroying or tampering with evidence, case 
files or court records);  
• Failing to disclose exculpatory evidence;  
• Threatening, badgering or tampering with 
witnesses;  
• Using false or misleading evidence;  
• Harassing, displaying bias toward, or having 
a vendetta against the defendant or 
defendant’s counsel (including selective or 
vindictive prosecution, which includes 
instances of denial of a speedy trial); and 
• Improper behavior during grand jury 
proceedings.3  
Numerous articles and books have been written about the 
many forms of prosecutorial misconduct.4  
I do not attempt to present a comprehensive 
discussion of prosecutorial misconduct in this one article, as 
such a task would be impossible in light of the breadth of the 
problem.  Instead, I attempt to demonstrate that the line 
between legal prosecutorial behavior and illegal prosecutorial 
misconduct is a thin one, and that a number of factors, 
including the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence and the 
prosecutorial culture of power and lack of accountability, 
create a climate that fosters misconduct.  I focus on Brady 
violations – the most common form of misconduct – and 
explore how and why prosecutors continue to engage in illegal 
behavior with impunity. 
 
The Breadth of the Problem 
 
Much of what passes for legal behavior might in fact 
be illegal, but because prosecutorial practices are so rarely 
challenged, it is difficult to define the universe of 
prosecutorial misconduct. Being so difficult to discover, much 
prosecutorial misconduct goes unchallenged, suggesting that 
the problem is much more widespread than the many reported 
cases of prosecutorial misconduct would indicate. In fact, it 
would be almost impossible to determine the extent of 
prosecutorial misconduct. As one editorial described the 
problem, “It would be like trying to count drivers who speed; 
the problem is larger than the number of tickets would 
indicate.”5
Much has been written on prosecutorial misconduct 
in recent years, but one of the most comprehensive studies was 
completed in 2003 by the Center for Public Integrity, a 
nonpartisan organization that conducts investigative research 
on public policy issues.  A team of twenty-one researchers and 
writers studied the problem for three years and examined 
11,452 cases in which charges of prosecutorial misconduct 
were reviewed by appellate court judges. In the majority of 
cases, the alleged misconduct was ruled harmless error or was 
not addressed by the appellate judges. The Center discovered 
that judges found prosecutorial misconduct in over 2,000 
cases, in which they dismissed charges, reversed convictions, 
or reduced sentences.6 In hundreds of additional cases, judges 
believed that the prosecutorial behavior was inappropriate, but 
affirmed the convictions under the “harmless error” doctrine.7
The cases investigated by the Center for Public 
Integrity only scratch the surface of the issue, the cases in 
which prosecutorial misconduct was discovered and litigated.  
However, there are many opportunities for prosecutors to 
engage in misconduct that are nearly impossible to discover. 
Most of the prosecutorial practices that occur behind closed 
doors, such as charging and plea bargaining decisions and 
grand jury practices, are never revealed to the public. Even 
after cases are indicted, defense attorneys are not entitled to 
discover what occurred behind the scenes. In the rare cases in 
which practices that appear to be illegal are discovered, it is 
often impractical to challenge them in light of the Supreme 
Court’s pro-prosecution decisions on prosecutorial 
misconduct. Of course, there is no opportunity to challenge 
any misconduct that may have occurred in the over 95% of all 
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criminal cases which result in a guilty plea since defendants 
give up most of their appellate rights when they plead guilty. 
Why is prosecutorial misconduct so widespread and 
how did it reach this stage? The Supreme Court bears much of 
the responsibility for fostering a culture in which prosecutors 
feel free to engage in misconduct. The Court has shielded 
prosecutors from scrutiny in a series of cases that have 
narrowly defined the universe of behaviors that constitute 
prosecutorial misconduct and the circumstances under which 
victims of such behaviors are entitled to relief. These cases 
have emboldened prosecutors to engage in misconduct, since 
they know that even if their behavior is discovered and 
challenged, courts will most likely find the behavior to be 
“harmless error.”  
 
The Supreme Court—Fostering a Culture of Misconduct 
 
 The Supreme Court is largely responsible for hiding 
prosecutorial misconduct from the public by establishing 
nearly impossible standards for obtaining the necessary 
discovery to seek judicial review.8 Many of the most 
damaging forms of misconduct occur behind closed doors. 
Inappropriate or unethical charging decisions, intimidating 
conversations with witnesses, selective and vindictive 
prosecutions, and grand jury abuse all occur in the privacy of 
prosecution offices – away from the public and the parties 
whose cases are affected by the harmful behavior. As a result 
of the Supreme Court’s rulings, prosecutors know that it is 
highly unlikely that any of these behaviors will be discovered 
by defense attorneys or anyone who might challenge them.9  
 On the rare occasion when such misconduct is 
discovered, judicial review is extremely limited. Under the 
harmless error rule, appellate courts affirm convictions if the 
evidence supports the defendant’s guilt, even if she did not 
receive a fair trial.10 This rule permits, perhaps even 
unintentionally encourages, prosecutors to engage in 
misconduct during trial with the assurance that so long as the 
evidence of the defendant’s guilt is clear, the conviction will 
be affirmed. 
In addition to its constitutional power to reverse 
lower court convictions, the Supreme Court’s supervisory 
authority to oversee the implementation of criminal justice 
grants the Court powers to regulate lower court procedures. 
For example, in McNabb v. United States,11 the Court 
concluded that when determining the admissibility of 
evidence, it obeys the Constitution, and, under its power of 
judicial supervision, formulates “civilized standards of 
procedure and evidence.”12 These standards are to be applied 
in federal criminal prosecutions, in an effort to deter 
governmental misconduct and preserve judicial integrity. The 
Court’s standards are satisfied by more than simple 
adherence to due process laws and are derived from 
considerations of “evidentiary relevance” and justice.13  
In United States v. Russell,14 however, the Supreme 
Court drastically curtailed the supervisory power doctrine by 
reversing a lower court’s use of the power in a case involving 
questionable law enforcement tactics. The Court invoked the 
separation of powers doctrine as it warned lower courts not to 
meddle in the business of law enforcement. In a further effort 
to limit the reach of a federal court’s supervisory power, in 
United States v. Hasting,15 the Court held that judges may not 
use the supervisory power doctrine to reverse convictions 
because of prosecutorial misconduct in cases involving 
harmless error.  
Civil lawsuits have proven equally ineffective as 
remedies for prosecutorial misconduct. The Supreme Court 
established a broad rule of absolute immunity from civil 
liability for prosecutors in Imbler v. Pachtman.16 This rule 
immunizes prosecutors from liability for acts “intimately 
associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.”17 
The Court expressed concern that prosecutors might be 
deterred from zealously pursuing their law enforcement 
responsibilities if they faced the possibility of civil liability 
and suggested that prosecutorial misconduct should be 
referred to state attorney disciplinary authorities. 
The Supreme Court’s decision to avoid the problem 
and pass it on to state bar authorities has proven totally 
ineffective.18 All attorneys, including prosecutors, must abide 
by their state’s Code of Professional Responsibility. Attorneys 
who violate the Code are subject to various forms of 
discipline, including disbarment. However, the Center for 
Public Integrity found only 44 cases since 1970 in which 
prosecutors faced disciplinary proceedings for misconduct that 
infringed upon the constitutional rights of criminal defendants. 
Examples of such misconduct include:  
• discovery violations;  
• improper contact with witnesses, defendants, 
judges or jurors;  
• improper behavior during hearings or trials;  
• prosecuting cases not supported by probable 
cause;  
• harassing or threatening defendants, 
defendants’ lawyers or witnesses;  
• using improper, false or misleading 
evidence;  
• displaying a lack of diligence or 
thoroughness in prosecution; and  
• making improper public statements about a 
pending criminal matter.19  
Out of the 44 attorney disciplinary cases:  
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• In 7, the court dismissed the complaint or 
did not impose a punishment.  
In 20, the court imposed a public or private 
reprimand or censure.  
• In 12, the prosecutor’s license to practice 
law was suspended.  
• In 2, the prosecutor was disbarred.  
• In 1, a period of probation was imposed in 
lieu of a harsher punishment.  
• In 24, the prosecutor was assessed the costs 
of the disciplinary proceedings.  
• In 3, the court remanded the case for further 
proceedings.20  
For many years, federal prosecutors refused to abide by 
state disciplinary rules.   In 1989, former Attorney General 
Richard Thornburgh issued a memorandum declaring that 
federal prosecutors would abide by internal Justice 
Department rules rather than the ethical rules of the state in 
which they practiced.21 Although this memorandum was 
overturned by the Citizens Protection Act of 1998,22 the Act 
simply returned prosecutors to the status quo, which has 
proven highly ineffective in deterring or punishing 
misconduct. 
It is not surprising that very few prosecutors are referred 
to state disciplinary authorities. In many ways, the 
phenomenon brings to mind the old saying, “If you shoot at 
the king, you’d better kill him.”  Defense attorneys are 
hesitant to refer prosecutors to disciplinary authorities because 
of the power they wield. Since over 95% of criminal cases 
result in guilty pleas,23 every defense attorney knows that her 
future clients are at the mercy of the prosecutor, whose 
unfettered discretion determines what plea offers will be made 
and to whom. Challenging the bar license of an official who 
holds all the cards is risky business, especially given the odds 
of prevailing. Prosecutors are powerful and often popular, 
political figures. Even when referrals are made, bar authorities 
frequently decline to recommend serious punishment, as the 
statistics from the Center for Public Integrity indicate.24 Thus, 
referring prosecutors to state bar authorities has proven to be a 
dismal failure.  
 The Court’s rulings have sent a very clear message to 
prosecutors – we will protect your practices from discovery; 
when they are discovered, we will make it extremely difficult 
for challengers to prevail; and as long as you mount 
overwhelming evidence against defendants, we will not 
reverse their convictions if you engage in misconduct at trial. 
Prosecutors are well aware of these facts, and although they 
may not always intentionally set out to engage in misconduct, 
the Supreme Court has provided them with a comfort zone 
that fosters and perhaps even encourages a culture of 
wrongdoing. 
 
Brady Violations:  Withholding Exculpatory Evidence 
 
The obligation of a prosecutor to reveal favorable, 
exculpatory information about a criminal defendant is not only 
fair; it is a constitutional requirement. In Brady v. Maryland,25 
the Supreme Court held that a prosecutor’s failure to disclose 
evidence favorable to the defendant violated due process 
rights when the defendant had requested such information. 
The Court expanded this rule in United States v. Agurs,26 and 
required prosecutors to turn over exculpatory information to 
the defense even in the absence of a request. Professional 
ethical and disciplinary rules in each state and the District of 
Columbia reiterate and reinforce the duty to turn over 
information. The obligation to reveal Brady information is 
ongoing and is not excused even if the prosecutor acts in good 
faith. 
Brady violations are among the most common forms 
of prosecutorial misconduct. Because the obligation is 
expansive, continuing, and not limited by the good faith 
efforts of the prosecutor, great potential for wrongdoing exists. 
The failure to provide Brady information can have dire 
consequences for the defendant. In capital cases, Brady 
violations have resulted in the execution of arguably innocent 
persons. At the very least, withholding Brady information can 
determine the outcome of a trial. 
Ken Armstrong and Maurice Possley, staff writers for 
the Chicago Tribune conducted a national study of 11,000 
cases involving prosecutorial misconduct between the Brady 
decision in 1963 and 1999.27 The study revealed widespread, 
almost routine, violations of the Brady doctrine by prosecutors 
across the country.28 They discovered that since 1963 courts 
dismissed homicide convictions against at least 381 
defendants because prosecutors either concealed exculpatory 
information or presented false evidence.29 Of the 381 
defendants, 67 had been sentenced to death.30 Courts 
eventually freed approximately 30 of the 67 death row 
inmates, including two defendants who were exonerated by 
DNA tests.31 One innocent defendant served 26 years before a 
court reversed his conviction.32 Armstrong and Possley 
suggest that this number represents only a fraction of cases 
involving this type of prosecutorial misconduct since the study 
only considered cases where courts convicted the defendant of 
killing another individual.33 They also reported that the 
prosecutors, who engaged in the reported misconduct, were 
neither convicted of a crime nor barred from practicing law.34  
Another study by Bill Moushey of the Pittsburgh 
Post-Gazette found similar results.35 In his examination of 
over 1500 cases throughout the nation, Moushey discovered 
that “prosecutors routinely withhold evidence that might help 
prove a defendant innocent.”36 He found that prosecutors 
intentionally withheld evidence in hundreds of cases during 
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It is not surprising that 
very few prosecutors are 
referred to state 
disciplinary authorities.  
In many ways, the 
phenomenon brings to 
mind the old saying, “If 
you shoot at the king, 
you’d better kill him.” 
 
the past decade, but that courts overturned verdicts in only the 
most extreme cases.37  
Few defense attorneys have the time, resources, or 
expertise to conduct massive investigations of prosecution 
officials. Nor should the discovery of prosecutorial 
misconduct depend on investigative reporting. However, the 
current law and practices result in the random and infrequent 
discovery of Brady violations. Even when discovered, 
remedies for the accused and punishment of the offending 
prosecutor are rare and inadequate. 
 
Misconduct that Leads to a Death Sentence 
  
Prosecutorial misconduct in any case is reprehensible 
and can lead to the wrongful conviction of the innocent. When 
misconduct occurs in a capital case, however, the stakes are 
the highest because an innocent person might be sentenced to 
death.  In fact, prosecutorial misconduct has been discovered 
in an extraordinary number of capital cases.38 Although 
various types of misconduct have been 
reported in capital cases, a high percentage of 
these cases, 16 - 19%,39 involve Brady 
violations. Delma Banks’ case is one 
example.40 The misconduct in Banks’ case 
was so egregious that even the United States 
Supreme Court, which had been unreceptive 
to claims of prosecutorial misconduct in the 
past, provided relief.41
 In 1980, Texas authorities charged 
Delma Banks with the death of 16-year-old 
Richard Whitehead.  Prior to Banks’ trial, the 
prosecutor informed Banks’ defense attorney 
that he had turned over all discoverable 
information.42 In fact, the prosecutor failed to 
reveal key exculpatory information about two of its primary 
witnesses – Charles Cook and Robert Farr. During the trial, 
Cook testified that Banks had confessed to killing Whitehead 
and that he saw Banks with blood on his leg and in possession 
of a gun soon after Whitehead’s death.43 On cross-
examination, Cook denied that he rehearsed his testimony with 
law enforcement officials.44 Farr testified during the trial as 
well, and corroborated key aspects of Cook’s testimony.45 
During Farr’s cross-examination, he denied that law 
enforcement officials promised him anything in exchange for 
his testimony.46 Farr also testified during the penalty phase of 
Banks’ trial in support of his death sentence.47 Banks was 
sentenced to death.48
Banks filed several post-conviction motions in Texas 
state courts.49 The Court denied the first two motions on 
grounds unrelated to alleged Brady violations, but the third 
motion alleged that the prosecutor failed to reveal exculpatory 
information about Cook and Farr.50  The third motion was 
denied, but Banks raised the allegations of Brady violations 
again in 1996 in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.51 
Prior to an evidentiary hearing on Banks’ motion, the 
magistrate judge ordered the prosecutor to turn over the 
prosecutor’s trial files.52 Information in the prosecutor’s files, 
affidavits signed by Cook and the deputy Sheriff, and 
evidence uncovered at the hearing proved extraordinary and 
egregious prosecutorial misconduct.53
 Hidden in the prosecutor’s file was a 74-page 
transcript of Cook’s interrogation by law enforcement officers 
and prosecutors.54 During this interrogation, Cook was 
coached repeatedly on what to say at trial and how to reconcile 
his many inconsistent statements.55 In his affidavit, Cook 
stated that he was warned that if he did not conform his 
testimony to the state’s evidence, he would “spend the rest of 
his life in prison.”56 The deputy sheriff testified at the hearing, 
and revealed, for the first time, that Farr, the other witness, 
was a paid police informant who received $200 for his 
assistance in Banks’ case.57  
 The prosecutor obviously knew 
that Cook’s testimony had been coached, 
even scripted, and that Farr was a paid 
informant. These facts were clearly 
exculpatory and should have been revealed 
to the defense prior to trial.  Furthermore, 
the prosecutor knew that Cook and Farr 
committed perjury when they denied these 
facts under oath during the trial, yet he 
allowed these lies to become part of the 
record  and even based part of his closing 
argument on  the credibility of both 
witnesses.58   
 The magistrate judge granted 
partial relief after the evidentiary hearing, recommending a 
writ of habeas corpus as to the death sentence, but not the 
guilty verdict.59 The District Court adopted the magistrate’s 
recommendation, but the Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit reversed the District Court’s grant of partial relief to. 
Banks.60 In March 2003, just ten minutes before Banks’ 
scheduled execution by lethal injection and after he had been 
strapped to the gurney, the Supreme Court issued a stay of 
execution while it decided whether to review Banks’ case.  
The Court ultimately decided to hear Banks’ claims 
and overturned his death sentence on February 24, 2004, by a 
7-2 vote.61 In reversing the Fifth Circuit’s decision, the 
Supreme Court held that Banks had demonstrated all three 
elements of a Brady prosecutorial misconduct claim: “The 
evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either 
because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that 
evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either 
willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.”62 
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The Court used particularly harsh language in criticizing the 
prosecutor’s conduct: 
“The State here nevertheless urges, in effect, 
that “the prosecution can lie and conceal and 
the prisoner still has the burden to ... 
discover the evidence.”[. . . ]A rule thus 
declaring ‘”prosecutor may hide, defendant 
must seek,’” is not tenable in a system 
constitutionally bound to accord defendants 
due process.” 63
 The grave injustices in Delma Banks’ case were, 
unfortunately, not unusual. Brady violations are very common 
in prosecutors’ offices, even violations as egregious as those 
in Banks’ case.64  The Supreme Court and lower courts have 
affirmed convictions in cases involving similar violations.65 
So why did the Court provide relief for Delma Banks? There 
are a number of possible explanations. 
 First, Banks faced death at the hands of the state in a 
case where prosecutors deliberately withheld evidence. The 
Court has always noted that “death is different”66 and has 
provided more protections for defendants facing death than for 
others.67 The Supreme Court undoubtedly has been affected by 
the growing evidence of innocent people being freed from 
death row as a result of DNA evidence and investigative 
reporting.68 Its death penalty jurisprudence in recent years 
reflects more sensitivity to the rights of death row inmates.69
 Second, the Banks case garnered widespread national 
attention and support for Banks from an unusual combination 
of groups and individuals.  One of the amicus briefs for Delma 
Banks was submitted by a group of former federal judges, 
prosecutors, and public officials, including federal judges John 
Gibbons, Timothy Lewis and William Sessions. Sessions is 
also a former director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 
Thomas Sullivan, a former United States Attorney for the 
Northern District of Illinois, also joined this brief, and the 
American Bar Association filed an amicus brief on behalf of 
Mr. Banks. 
 Third, some have speculated that the Supreme Court 
has taken umbrage in what it perceives as defiance of its 
jurisprudence by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.70 
There is certainly language in Banks that lends some credence 
to this theory. In Banks, the Court cites and relies upon its 
holding in Strickler v. Greene and chides the Fifth Circuit for 
ignoring it: “Surprisingly, the Court of Appeals’ per curiam 
opinion did not refer to Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 119 
S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999), the controlling precedent 
on the issue of ‘cause.’”71
 Regardless of its reasons, the Court’s holding in 
Banks is a welcome departure from its usual deference to 
prosecutors. It remains to be seen whether Banks is the 
beginning of a trend towards holding the fire to prosecutors’ 
feet or an anomaly attributable to Banks’ death row status at a 
time when the death penalty is under particular scrutiny.  The 
latter characterization is more likely in light of the large body 
of Supreme Court jurisprudence that defers to prosecutorial 
power and discretion.  
 
Why Prosecutors Escape Punishment  
 Prosecutors are rarely punished for misconduct, even 
when the misconduct causes tremendous harm to its victims. 
Unfortunately, Delma Banks’ experience is not uncommon.  
The Center for Public Integrity examined over 11,000 cases 
involving claims of prosecutorial misconduct during a three-
year period, and these were only the cases that were reviewed 
by an appellate court.72  The courts found prosecutorial 
misconduct in thousands of theses cases, but affirmed the 
convictions based on a finding of “harmless error.”73 In more 
than 2,000 cases in which convictions were reversed, charges 
ultimately dismissed, or sentences reduced, most of the 
prosecutors suffered no consequences and were not held 
accountable or even reprimanded for their behavior.74
 Ken Armstrong and Maurice Possley found the same 
lack of punishment and accountability in their 1999 study:  
With impunity, prosecutors across the 
country have violated their oaths and the 
law, committing the worst kinds of 
deception in the most serious of cases. . . . 
They have prosecuted black men, hiding 
evidence the real killers were white. They 
have prosecuted a wife, hiding evidence her 
husband committed suicide. They have 
prosecuted parents, hiding evidence their 
daughter was killed by wild dogs. 
They do it to win. 
 
They do it because they won’t get 
punished.75
Armstrong and Possley found that a number of the prosecutors 
not only totally escaped punishment or even a reprimand, but 
advanced in their careers.76 In the 381 cases they examined in 
which appellate courts reversed convictions based on either 
Brady violations or prosecutors knowingly allowing lying 
witnesses to testify, the courts described the behavior in terms 
such as “unforgivable,” “intolerable,” “beyond reprehension,” 
and “illegal, improper and dishonest.”77  Yet, of those cases: 
One was fired, but appealed and was 
reinstated with back pay. Another received 
an in-house suspension of 30 days. A third 
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prosecutor’s law license was suspended for 
59 days, but because of other misconduct in 
the case. [. . .] Not one received any kind of 
public sanction from a state lawyer 
disciplinary agency or was convicted of any 
crime for hiding evidence or presenting false 
evidence, the Tribune found. Two were 
indicted, but the charges were dismissed 
before trial.78
None of the prosecutors were publicly sanctioned or charged 
with a crime. It is unclear whether any were sanctioned by 
state bar authorities because these proceedings are not a 
matter of public record if the sanction was minor. Several of 
the offending prosecutors advanced significantly in their 
careers: 
In Georgia, George “Buddy” Darden 
became a congressman after a court 
concluded that he withheld evidence in a 
case where seven men, later exonerated, 
were convicted of murder and one was 
sentenced to death. In New Mexico, Virginia 
Ferrara failed to disclose evidence of 
another suspect in a murder case. By the 
time the conviction was reversed she had 
become chief disciplinary counsel for the 
New Mexico agency that polices lawyers for 
misconduct.79
 If state bar authorities are hesitant to bring 
disciplinary actions against prosecutors, it is not surprising 
that criminal charges are even more infrequent. Yet, much of 
prosecutorial misconduct is criminal behavior. When 
prosecutors knowingly put witnesses on the stand to testify 
falsely, they suborn perjury. Subornation of perjury is a felony 
in all fifty states.80 Many Brady violations constitute 
obstruction of justice, which is also a felony in some 
jurisdictions.81 Prosecutors are not above the law or immune 
from prosecution. In fact, as the chief law enforcement 
officers, they should be held to the highest standard of 
conduct. Yet despite overwhelming evidence that prosecutors 
routinely break the law, they are not punished. 
 One of the rare prosecutions for prosecutorial 
misconduct occurred in 1999 in DuPage County, Illinois.82  
Three former prosecutors and four sheriff’s deputies were 
indicted and tried for various criminal offenses, including 
obstruction of justice and subornation of perjury.83 The 
charges grew out of allegations that the prosecutors hid 
exculpatory evidence and knowingly put witnesses on the 
stand to lie under oath in the trial of Rolando Cruz.84 Cruz, 
Alejandro Hernandez and Stephen Buckley faced the death 
penalty for the abduction, sexual assault and murder of a 10-
year-old girl.85 The facts of the case were particularly 
gruesome, and there was much pressure to find and convict the 
perpetrators. 
 The prosecutors’ behavior in the Cruz case was 
particularly egregious. They hid exculpatory evidence from 
defense counsel, including a confession to the crime by a 
convicted murderer and forensic reports from several experts 
demonstrating that the shoe print in the victim’s home did not 
belong to any of the defendants.86 Additionally, the deputies 
involved in the case allegedly fabricated an incriminating 
statement that they claimed Mr. Cruz made while in jail.87  In 
fact, two DuPage sheriff’s investigators and an assistant 
Illinois Attorney General were so convinced of wrongdoing by 
the prosecutors and deputies that they resigned rather than 
support the prosecution of Mr. Cruz.88  Charges against 
Buckley were ultimately dismissed, but Cruz and Hernandez 
were tried and convicted.89 Their convictions were overturned 
and they were tried and convicted a second time, only to have 
their convictions reversed again.90 Neither reversal was based 
on allegations of prosecutorial misconduct.91  At Cruz’s third 
trial, there was overwhelming evidence of perjury by the 
sheriff’s deputies, and Cruz was acquitted.92  
 After Cruz’s acquittal, the Chief Judge of the DuPage 
County Circuit Court appointed a special prosecutor to 
investigate the sheriff’s deputies.93 The special prosecutor 
expanded his investigation to include the prosecutors and 
ultimately returned the indictment that led to their trial.94 The 
trial received relatively little national coverage, despite its 
historic significance. According to Armstrong and Possley, 
only six prosecutors in this century have been prosecuted for 
the type of misconduct alleged against the Cruz prosecutors.95 
Two were convicted of minor misdemeanors and fined $500, 
two were acquitted, and charges against the other two were 
dismissed before trial.96
 All seven of the defendants – the prosecutors and the 
sheriff’s deputies – were acquitted of all charges.97 A number 
of the jurors spent the better part of the evening of the 
acquittal celebrating with the defendants in a local 
steakhouse.98 The former prosecutors – Patrick King, Thomas 
Knight, and Robert Kilander – went on to pursue successful 
legal careers. Patrick King is an assistant United States 
Attorney in the Northern District of Illinois.99 Thomas Knight 
practices law in the private sector; and Robert Kilander is a 
judge in the very court where he faced criminal charges. 
Thomas Knight eventually filed a lawsuit against Armstrong, 
Possley and the Chicago Tribune.100
 Most prosecutors that engage in misconduct not only 
escape punishment, but advance in their careers. Paul Howes, 
a former United States Attorney in the District of Columbia, 
was accused of prosecutorial misconduct on several occasions.  
After a two-year investigation of Howes’ behavior, the Justice 
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Department’s Office of Professional Responsibility concluded 
that Howes had abused the witness stipend system by doling 
out excessive payments to cooperating witnesses and their 
family and friends, who were not witnesses. Acknowledging 
that Howes’ behavior constituted criminal conduct, 
investigators declined to prosecute him, instead agreeing to 
drastically reduce the sentences of the defendants convicted in 
the cases in which misconduct was found.101 Howes is now a 
partner at the San Diego firm Lerach, Coughlin, Stoia, Geller, 
Rudman & Robbins. 
 Howes’ experience is typical. Cook County, Illinois 
prosecutors Carol Pearce McCarthy, Kenneth Wadas, and 
Patrick Quinn were all scathingly criticized in appellate 
opinions for misconduct during trial. All three were promoted 
to supervisor positions, and all three became judges.102  
 
When misconduct is neither 
acknowledged nor punished, 
the line between acceptable 
behavior and misconduct 
begins to blur. 
 Why do prosecutors escape 
punishment for prosecutorial 
misconduct? The responses of the 
Supreme Court, state and federal 
disciplinary authorities, and the general 
public provide some insight. The 
Supreme Court’s deference to 
prosecutors and the harmless error 
doctrine might be attributable to the fact 
that the remedy generally sought is 
reversal of a criminal case. The Court’s hesitancy to reverse 
criminal convictions when there is substantial evidence of a 
defendant’s guilt indicates that it places a higher premium on 
affirming convictions than in punishing prosecutors who do 
wrong. In addition, some might argue that reversing a criminal 
conviction does not directly or sufficiently punish prosecutors 
for wrongdoing. 
 State and federal bar authorities rarely punish 
prosecutors for the reasons previously mentioned. First, they 
seldom receive formal complaints about prosecutors, because 
the people most likely to discover the misconduct – defense 
attorneys – fear retaliation from prosecution offices that will 
continue to wield power and exercise considerable discretion 
in their clients’ cases. Second, even when complaints are 
made, the punishment is light – perhaps because of the 
deference and respect prosecutors generally receive from the 
legal profession. 
 But what about the general public? On the rare 
occasions that the public has been informed about 
prosecutorial misconduct, there has not been public outcry, 
nor have prosecutors been voted out of office for their 
behavior. The Chicago Tribune and Pittsburgh Post-Gazette 
articles reported egregious behavior by local prosecutors, yet 
these articles did not result in the public taking action against 
the offending prosecutors. There are a number of possible 
reasons for the lack of response. Perhaps members of the 
general public did not read the articles. Or they may have read 
about the misconduct but dismissed or excused it, indicating a 
disturbing support of ignoring the rule of law in the interest of 
catching criminals. On the other hand, the public may not 
endorse prosecutorial misconduct, but may not know how to 
take action to stop it.103 Even if the prosecutor is an elected 
official who may be voted out of office, the next election may 
be years away when the prosecutorial misconduct may be long 
forgotten. 
 The public may certainly punish prosecutorial 
misconduct if the offending prosecutor is charged and 
exercises his/her right to trial. But these prosecutions are 
extremely rare, and the few in this century have not resulted in 
serious punishment. It would be unwise to draw any broad 
conclusions about the general public’s reaction to 
prosecutorial misconduct from these few prosecutions, 
primarily because there have been too few 
prosecutions from which to draw a 
conclusion, and also because the public 
did not play a role in the outcome of most 
of the cases since most of them never went 
to trial. The acquittal of the Cruz 
prosecutors seems to indicate an 
acceptance of prosecutorial wrongdoing, 
at least by the jurors who acquitted them. 
But because there are so many factors that 
affect a jury verdict, in the absence of first-hand information 
from the jurors themselves, one cannot know with certainty 
what factors or issues led them to acquit.  
 An informal poll conducted by the Chicago Tribune 
after the publication of its series on prosecutorial misconduct 
may offer some guidance on the public’s view of prosecutorial 
misconduct. The Tribune posted the following question: “An 
investigation by the Chicago Tribune found that prosecutor 
misconduct is commonplace in felony cases brought in Cook 
County. But Chicago is not alone. Scores of murder 
convictions have been thrown out around the country because 
of dishonest prosecutions. What do you think should be done 
to remedy this situation?” Readers responded as follows:  
“[Prosecutors] should be prosecuted for their crimes;” “We 
need more effective checks and balances on the unfettered 
discretion about what and whom to charge. We also need a 
more certain sanction for those prosecutors found guilty of 
fudging or hiding the evidence;” “The first thing to do is 
eliminate the immunity that they and our prosecutors, judges, 
and other bureaucrats do not deserve . . . At a minimum we 
need to raise the standard of proof in order to execute someone 
accused of murder . . . Last, but not least, prosecutors need to 
be prevented from buying testimony from criminals to help 
prosecute others.;” “We need institutional reform;” “Our 
judicial system as a whole, needs to be overhauled.”104  
These responses may suggest that, even in cases 
involving serious criminal behavior, the American public 
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ultimately wants the laws to be enforced fairly. The poll also 
suggests that the lack of public outrage over prosecutorial 
misconduct may be a result of lack of information about what 
prosecutors do and how they behave.  
The Thin Line 
 
 Prosecutors wield incredible power and exercise 
broad discretion in the important decisions they make every 
day – especially charging and plea-bargaining decisions.  
Their decision-making is often arbitrary, hasty, and impulsive, 
sometimes resulting in great disparities among similarly-
situated defendants and crime victims. Because prosecutors 
make these decisions in private without meaningful 
supervision or accountability, they are rarely punished when 
they engage in misconduct.  In fact, they are often rewarded 
with promotions and career advancement as long as their 
conviction rates remain high. This system produces a cycle of 
misconduct that is continually reinforced.  It is easier for 
prosecutors to secure a conviction when they withhold 
exculpatory evidence, and since they suffer no consequences 
for withholding it and are rewarded for securing convictions, 
they continue the misconduct. 
 When misconduct is neither acknowledged nor 
punished, the line between acceptable behavior and 
misconduct begins to blur. Some prosecutors may not actually 
realize the illegality of their behavior, especially 
inexperienced prosecutors in offices that foster a culture of 
winning at any cost. If a prosecution office does not train its 
prosecutors to reveal Brady information and otherwise play by 
the rules, these prosecutors may unknowingly cross the line 
from acceptable to illegal behavior. Even when prosecutors 
know their behavior is illegal, the harmless error doctrine and 
the absence of meaningful oversight by bar disciplinary 




When the law is broken by the very people the public 
trusts to enforce the law, meaningful action must be taken. 
Prosecutorial misconduct is widespread and unchecked, and it 
is unlikely that either the courts or the general public will take 
action to eliminate it. Prosecutors certainly have not policed 
themselves. Thus, the legal profession must take the lead in 
instituting meaningful reform that will assure oversight and 
strict accountability when prosecutors break the law.  
Although criminal lawyers in individual cases may not have 
the ability to affect meaningful reform, other lawyers, through 
local and national bar associations, should advocate for 
legislation and binding professional rules that will be 
enforced against wrongdoers. Lawyers have a vested interest 
in improving the reputation of the profession and in the fair 
administration of justice for everyone. They also have the 
expertise to institute reforms and the responsibility to 
eliminate what has become a shameful epidemic of 
misconduct among prosecutors.  
 
* Angela J. Davis, a professor of Criminal Law and Criminal 
Procedure at American University, Washington College of 
Law, has written various articles and book chapters on race, 
crime and prosecutorial discretion.  She worked for 12 years 
at the Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia, 
spending the last 3 years as the Director.  She received her 
B.A. from Howard University and her J.D. from Harvard 
University.  
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Based on a study conducted by the Innocent Project, 
evaluating the first 100 cases that were overturned based upon 
post-conviction evidence, of the first 70 cases reversed:  
• Over 30 of them involved prosecutorial misconduct. 
• Over 30 of them involved police misconduct which led 
to wrongful convictions. 
• Approximately 15 of them involved false witness 
testimony.   
• 34% of the police misconduct cases involved 
suppression of exculpatory evidence.  11% 
involved evidence fabrication.   
• 37% of the prosecutorial misconduct cases involved 
suppression of exculpatory evidence.  25% involved 
knowing use of false testimony.  
 
*Innocence Project, at http://www.caught.net/innoc.htm. 
 
